On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy
  evolutionary game by Duong, Manh Hong & Han, The Anh
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
On the expected number of equilibria in a
multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game
Manh Hong Duong · The Anh Han
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract In this paper, we analyse the mean number E(n, d) of internal equi-
libria in a general d-player n-strategy evolutionary game where the agents’ pay-
offs are normally distributed. First, we give a computationally implementable
formula for the general case. Next, we characterize the asymptotic behaviour
of E(2, d), estimating its lower and upper bounds as d increases. Then we pro-
vide a closed formula for E(n, 2). Two important consequences are obtained
from this analysis. On the one hand, we show that in both cases the proba-
bility of seeing the maximal possible number of equilibria tends to zero when
d or n respectively goes to infinity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that
the expected number of stable equilibria is bounded within a certain interval.
Finally, for larger n and d, numerical results are provided and discussed.
Keywords Evolutionary game · multi-player games · multiple strategies ·
random polynomials · number of equilibria · random games.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the suitable mathematical framework whenever
there is frequency dependent selection – the fitness of an individual does not
only depend on its strategy, but also on the composition of the population in
relation with (multiple) other strategies [MS82,HS98,Now06]. The payoff from
the games is interpreted as individual fitness, naturally leading to a dynami-
cal approach. As in classical game theory with the Nash equilibrium [MB05,
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McL05], the analysis of properties of equilibrium points in evolutionary game
theory has been of special interest [MS82,BCV97,GT10]. Herein, equilibrium
points of a dynamical system predict the composition of strategy frequen-
cies where all the strategies have the same average fitness. Biologically, these
points can predict a co-existence of different types in a population and the
maintenance of polymorphism.
Recently, some attention has been paid to both numerical and analyt-
ical studies of equilibrium points and their stability in random evolution-
ary games [GT10,HTG12]. The focus was on analyzing the probability of
observing a certain number of equilibria (whether counting all equilibria or
only the stable ones) if the payoff entries are randomly drawn. This proba-
bility allows one to predict the complexity of the interactions as the num-
ber of strategies and the number of players in the game increase, especially
when the environments are unknown or changing rapidly over time [FH92,
GRLD09]. Furthermore, these studies have paid substantial attention to the
maximal number of equilibrium points and the attainability of the patterns
of evolutionarily stable strategies, as knowing them is insightful, and his-
torically they have been studied extensively, not only in classical and evo-
lutionary game theory, but also in other fields such as population genet-
ics [MS82,Kar80,VC88a,VC88b,KF70,VC88c,Hai89,BCV94,BCV93,BCV97,
Alt10,GT10,HTG12,BR13]. However, as the studies deal with the concrete
numbers of equilibrium points, they have needed to take a direct approach
that consists of solving a system of polynomial equations, the degree of which
increases with the number of players in a game. As such, the mathematical
analysis was mostly restricted to evolutionary games with a small number of
players, due to the impossibility of solving general polynomial equations of a
high degree [Abe24,HTG12].
In this paper, we ask instead the question: what is the mean or expected
number of equilibria that one can observe if the payoff matrix entries of the
game are randomly drawn? Knowing the mean number of equilibria not only
gives important insights into the overall complexity of the interactions as the
number of participating players in the game and the potential strategies that
the players can adopt are magnified. It also enables us to predict the boundaries
of the concrete numbers of (stable) equilibrium points such as the maximal one
as we show later on in the paper. By connecting to the theory of random poly-
nomials [EK95], we first provide an exact, computationally implementable,
formula for the expected number of equilibria in a general multi-player multi-
strategy random game when the payoff entries are normally distributed. Sec-
ondly, we derive lower and upper bounds of such a formula for the case of
two-player games and provide an explicit formula for the case of two-strategy
games. As a consequence, we can derive similar bounds when considering only
equilibrium points that are stable. Finally, numerical results are provided and
discussed when there are more players and strategies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the models and methods: the replicator equation in evolution game theory
and the random polynomial theory are summarized in Sections 2.1 and 2.2,
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respectively. The link between them, which is a major aspect of our method,
is described in Section 2.3. The main results of this paper are presented in
Section 3, starting with two-strategy games in Section 3.1, then with two-
player games in Section 3.2, and lastly, with the general case of games with
arbitrary numbers of players and strategies in Section 3.3. We compare our
results with related ones in the literature and discuss some future directions
in Section 4. Finally, some detailed computations are given in the Appendix.
2 Models and Methods
2.1 Evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics
The classical approach to evolutionary games is replicator dynamics [TJ78,
Zee80,HS98,SS83,Now06], describing that whenever a strategy has a fitness
larger than the average fitness of the population, it is expected to spread.
Formally, let us consider an infinitely large population with n strategies, nu-
merated from 1 to n. They have frequencies xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, respectively,
satisfying that 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The interaction of the indi-
viduals in the population is in randomly selected groups of d participants,
that is, they play and obtain their fitness from d-player games. We consider
here symmetrical games (e.g. the public goods games and their generalizations
[Har68,HDMHS02,SSP08,PSSS09,HMPLss]) in which the order of the partic-
ipants is irrelevant. Let αi0i1,...,id−1 be the payoff of the focal player, where i0
(1 ≤ i0 ≤ n) is the strategy of the focal player, and let ik (with 1 ≤ ik ≤ n
and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) be the strategy of the player in position k. These payoffs
form a (d − 1)-dimensional payoff matrix [GT10], which satisfies (because of
the game symmetry)
αi0i1,...,id−1 = α
i0
i′1,...,i
′
d−1
, (1)
whenever {i′1 . . . , i′d−1} is a permutation of {i1 . . . , id−1}. This means that only
the fraction of each strategy in the game matters.
The average payoff or fitness of the focal player is given by
pii0 =
n∑
i1,...,id−1=1
αi0i1,...,id−1
d−1∏
k=1
xik . (2)
By abuse of notation, let us denote αi0k1,...,kn := α
i0
i1,...,id−1 , where ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
with
∑n
i=1 ki = d−1, is the number of players using strategy i in {i1, . . . , id−1}.
Hence, from Equation (1), the fitness of strategy i0 can be rewritten as follows
pii0 =
∑
0≤k1,...,kn≤d−1,
n∑
i=1
ki=d−1
αi0k1,...,kn
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n∏
i=1
xkii for i0 = 1, . . . , n, (3)
4 Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han
where
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)
= (d−1)!n∏
k=1
ki!
are the multinomial coefficients.
Now the replicator equations for games with n strategies can be written
as follows [HS98,Sig10]
x˙i = xi (pii − 〈pi〉) for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (4)
where 〈pi〉 = ∑nk=1 xk pik is the average payoff of the population. The equi-
librium points of the system are given by the points (x1, . . . , xn) satisfying
the condition that the fitness of all strategies are the same. That is, they are
represented by solutions of the system of equations
pii = pin for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. (5)
Subtracting from each of the equations the term pin we obtain a system
of n− 1 polynomials of degree d− 1∑
0≤k1,...,kn≤d−1,
n∑
i=1
ki=d−1
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n∏
i=1
xkii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (6)
where βik1,...,kn−1 := α
i
k1,...,kn
− αnk1,...,kn . Assuming that all the payoff entries
have the same probability distribution, then all βik1,...,kn−1 , i = 1, . . . , n − 1,
have symmetric distributions, i.e. with mean 0 (see also the proof in [HTG12]).
In the following analysis, we focus on internal equilibrium points [GT10,
HTG12], i.e. 0 < xi < 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Hence, by using the transfor-
mation yi =
xi
xn
, with 0 < yi < +∞ and 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, dividing the left hand
side of the above equation by xd−1n we obtain the following equation in terms
of (y1, . . . , yn−1) that is equivalent to (6)
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n−1∏
i=1
ykii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
(7)
As stated, one of the main goals of this article is to compute the expected
number of (internal) equilibria in a general n-strategy d-player random evolu-
tionary game. That consists in computing the expected number of solutions
(y1, . . . , yn−1) ∈ R+n−1 of the system of (n− 1) polynomials of degree (d− 1)
in (7). Furthermore, herein our analysis focuses on payoff matrices with nor-
mally distributed entries. It is known that, even for n = 2, it is impossible
to analytically solve the system whenever d > 5 [Abe24], as seen in [HTG12].
Hence, it is not feasible to use this direct approach of analytically solving the
system if one wants to deal with games with a large number of players and
with multiple strategies. In this work, we address this issue by connecting to
the theory of random polynomials described in the following section.
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2.2 Random polynomial theory
Keeping the form of Eq. (7) in mind, we consider a system of n − 1 random
polynomials of degree d− 1,
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,∑n−1
i=1 ki≤d−1
aik1,...,kn−1
n−1∏
i=1
ykii = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, (8)
where aik1,...,kn−1 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) multivari-
ate normal random vectors with mean zero and covariance matrix C. Denote
by v(y) the vector whose components are all the monomials
{ n−1∏
i=1
ykii
}
where
0 ≤ ki ≤ d − 1 and
n−1∑
i=1
ki ≤ d − 1. Let A denote the random matrix whose
i−th row contains all coefficients aik1,...,kn−1 . Then (8) can be re-written as
Av(y) = 0. (9)
The following theorem is the starting point of the analysis of this paper.
Theorem 1 [EK95, Theorem 7.1] Let U be any measurable subset of Rn−1.
Assume that the rows of A are i.i.d. multivariate normal random vectors with
mean zero and covariance matrix C. The expected number of real roots of the
system of equations (9) that lie in the set U is given by
pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫
U
(
det
[
∂2
∂xi∂yj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
]
ij
) 1
2
dt.
2.3 From random polynomial theory to evolutionary game theory
Let E(n, d) be the number of internal equilibria in a d−player random game
with n strategies. As has been shown in Section 2.1, E(n, d) is the same as
the number of positive solutions of Eq. (7). We will apply Theorem 1 with
aik1,...,kn−1 = β
i
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
)
and U = [0,∞)n−1 ⊂ Rn−1.
Suppose that all βik1,...,kn−1 are Gaussian distributions with mean 0 and
variance 1, then for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), Ai =
{
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
)}
is
a multivariate normal random vector with mean zero and covariance matrix
C given by
C = diag
((
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
)2)
0≤ki≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
. (10)
We obtain the following lemma, which is a direct application of Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1 Assume that {Ai}1≤i≤n−1 are independent normal random vectors
with mean zero and covariance matrix C as in (10). The expected number of
internal equilibria in a d-player n-strategy random game is given by
E(n, d) = pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫ ∞
0
. . .
∫ ∞
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
(
det
[
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
]
ij
) 1
2
dt,
(11)
where
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2 n∏
i=1
xkii y
ki
i . (12)
Denote by L the matrix with entries
Lij =
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
,
then E(n, d) can be written as
E(n, d) = pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫ ∞
0
. . .
∫ ∞
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
(detL)
1
2 dt. (13)
It has been shown that a d-player n-strategy game has at most (d − 1)n−1
isolated internal equilibria (and this bound is sharp) [HTG12]. We denote by
pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ (d − 1)n−1, the probability that the game has exactly i such
equilibria. Then E(n, d) can also be defined through pi as follows
E(n, d) =
(d−1)n−1∑
i=1
i · pi. (14)
3 Results
We start with the case where there are two strategies (n = 2), analytically
deriving the upper and lower bounds for E(2, d). Next we derive exact results
for games with two players (d = 2). Finally, we provide numerical results
and discussion for the general case with an arbitrary number of players and
strategies. For ease of representation, we start by assuming that the coefficients
βik1,...,kn−1 are standard normal distributions. We then show that the results
do not change if they have arbitrary identical normal distributions.
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3.1 Multi-player two-strategy games
We first consider games with an arbitrary number of players, but having only
two strategies, i.e. n = 2. In this case, Equation (7) is simplified to the following
univariate polynomial equation of degree d− 1 with y ∈ R+
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0. (15)
The following lemma describes a closed form of E(2, d).
Lemma 2 Assume that βk are independent Gaussian distributions with vari-
ance 1 and mean 0. Then the number of internal equilibria, E(2, d), in a
d−player random game with two strategies is given by
E(2, d) =
∫ ∞
0
f(t) dt, (16)
where
f(t) =
1
pi

d−1∑
k=1
k2
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2(k−1)
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k
−

d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k

2

1
2
. (17)
Proof Since βk has Gaussian distribution with variance 1 and mean 0, βk
(
d− 1
k
)
has Gaussian distribution with variance
(
d− 1
k
)2
and mean 0. According to
Lemma 1, the equality (16) holds with
f(t) =
1
pi
[
∂2
∂x∂y
(
log v(x)TCv(y)
) ∣∣∣
y=x=t
] 1
2
, (18)
where the vector v and the matrix C (covariance matrix) are given by
v(x) =

1
x
...
xd−1
 , C = (Cij)i,j=1,...,d−1 with Cij = δij
(
d− 1
i
)(
d− 1
j
)
,
(19)
where δij is the Kronecker notation,
δij =
{
1 if i = j,
0 if i 6= j.
8 Manh Hong Duong, The Anh Han
A straightforward calculation gives
v(x)TCv(y) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
xkyk,
and
∂2
∂x∂y
(
log v(x)TCv(y)
)
=
d−1∑
k=1
k2
(
d− 1
k
)2
xk−1yk−1
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
xkyk
−
(
d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
xkyk−1
)(
d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
xk−1yk
)
(
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
xkyk
)2 .
Substituting this expression into (18), we obtain (17).
Example 1 For the cases d = 2 and d = 3, we have
E(2, 2) =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + t2
dt =
1
pi
lim
t→+∞ tan
−1(t) = 0.5,
E(2, 3) =
2
pi
∫ ∞
0
√
t4 + t2 + 1
t4 + 4t2 + 1
dt ≈ 0.77.
The following proposition presents some properties of the density function f(t),
which will be used later for estimating the asymptotic behaviour of E(2, d).
Proposition 1 The following properties hold
1)
f(t) =
d− 1
pi
√
2d−4∑
k=0
ak t2k
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k
, (20)
where
ak =
∑
1≤i≤d−1
1≤j≤d−2
i+j=k
(
d− 1
i
)2(
d− 2
j
)2
−
∑
1≤i′≤d−2
1≤j′≤d−2
i′+j′=k
(
d− 2
i′
)(
d− 1
i′ + 1
)(
d− 2
j′
)(
d− 1
j′ + 1
)
,
(21)
ak = a2d−4−k, for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 2d− 4, a0 = a2d−4 = 1, ak ≥ 1.
(22)
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2) f(0) = d−1pi , f(1) =
d−1
2pi
1√
2d−3 .
3) f(t) = 12pi
[
1
tG
′(t)
] 1
2 , where
G(t) = t
d
dtMd(t)
Md(t)
= t
d
dt
logMd(t).
4) t 7→ f(t) is a decreasing function.
5) f
(
1
t
)
= t2f(t).
6)
E(2, d) = 2
∫ 1
0
f(t)dt = 2
∫ ∞
1
f(t) dt. (23)
Proof 1) Set
Md(t) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k, Ad(t) =
d−1∑
k=1
k2
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2(k−1), (24)
Bd(t) =
d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k−1. (25)
Then
f(t) =
1
pi
√
Ad(t)Md(t)−Bd(t)2
Md(t)
.
Using
k
(
d− 1
k
)
= (d− 1)
(
d− 2
k − 1
)
,
we can transform
Ad(t) = (d− 1)2
d−1∑
k=1
(
d− 2
k − 1
)2
t2(k−1) = (d− 1)2
d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)2
t2k = (d− 1)2Md−1(t),
Bd(t) = (d− 1)
d−1∑
k=1
(
d− 2
k − 1
)(
d− 1
k
)
t2k−1 = (d− 1)t
d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)(
d− 1
k + 1
)
t2k.
Therefore,
Ad(t)Md(t)−Bd(t)2
= (d− 1)2
(d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)2
t2k
)(
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
t2k
)
− t2
(
d−2∑
k=0
(
d− 2
k
)(
d− 1
k + 1
)
t2k
)2
= (d− 1)2
2d−4∑
k=0
ak t
2k,
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where
ak =
∑
0≤i≤d−1
0≤j≤d−2
i+j=k
(
d− 1
i
)2(
d− 2
j
)2
−
∑
0≤i′≤d−2
0≤j′≤d−2
i′+j′=k−1
(
d− 2
i′
)(
d− 1
i′ + 1
)(
d− 2
j′
)(
d− 1
j′ + 1
)
.
For the detailed computations of ak and the proof of (22), see Appendix 5.1.
2) The value of f(0) is found directly from (20). For the detailed computations
of f(1), see Appendix 5.2.
3) It follows from (24)-(25) that
Bd(t) =
1
2
M ′d(t), Ad(t) =
1
4t
(tM ′d(t))
′, (26)
where ′ is derivative with respect to t. Hence
f(t) =
1
2pi
( 1
t (tM
′
d(t))
′Md(t)−M ′d(t)2
Md(t)2
) 1
2
=
1
2pi
(
(tM ′d(t))
′Md(t)− tM ′d(t)2
tMd(t)2
) 1
2
=
1
2pi
(
1
t
G′(t)
) 1
2
,
where G(t) = t
M ′d(t)
Md(t)
.
4) Since Md(t) contains only even powers of t with positive coefficients, all of
its roots are purely imaginary. Suppose that
Md(t) =
d−1∏
i=1
(t2 + ri),
where ri > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1. It follows that
G(t) = t
M ′d(t)
Md(t)
=
d−1∑
i=1
2t2
t2 + ri
,
and hence
(2pif(t))2 =
1
t
G′(t) =
d−1∑
i=1
4ri
(t2 + ri)2
. (27)
Since ri > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , d− 1, the above equality implies that f(t) is
decreasing in t ∈ [0,∞).
5) Set
g(t) :=
√
Ad(t)Md(t)−Bd(t)2,
Then
f(t) =
1
pi
g(t)
Md(t)
. (28)
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It follows from the symmetric properties of the binomial coefficients that
Md
(
1
t
)
=
1
t2(d−1)
Md(t).
Similarly, from (22) we have
g
(
1
t
)
=
1
t2(d−2)
g(t).
Therefore
f
(
1
t
)
=
1
pi
g(1/t)
Md(1/t)
=
1
pi
t2
g(t)
Md(t)
= t2f(t).
6) By change of variable, s = 1t , and from 5), we have∫ ∞
1
f(t) dt =
∫ 0
1
f
(
1
s
) −1
s2
ds =
∫ 1
0
f(s) ds.
Therefore
E(2, d) =
∫ ∞
0
f(t) dt =
∫ 1
0
f(t) dt+
∫ ∞
1
f(t) dt = 2
∫ 1
0
f(t) dt.
Remark 1 We provide an alternative proof of the fifth property in the above
lemma in Appendix 5.3.
Remark 2 Besides enabling a significantly less complex numerical computa-
tion of E(2, d) (see already our numerical results using this formula in Table
1), the equality (23) reveals an interesting property: the expected number of
zeros of the polynomial P (y) in two intervals (0, 1) and (1,∞] are the same.
Equivalently, the expected numbers of internal equilibria in two intervals (0, 12 ]
and (12 , 1) are equal since y =
x
1−x . Indeed, this result also confirms the obser-
vation that by swapping indices between the two strategies (n = 2) we move
equilibrium from x to 1− x, thereby not resulting in change in the number of
equilibria.
Based on the analytical formula of E(2, d), we now provide upper and
lower bounds for the mean number of equilibria as the payoff entries of the
game are randomly drawn.
Theorem 2 E(2, d) satisfies the following estimate
d− 1
pi
√
2d− 3 ≤ E(2, d) ≤
1
pi
√
d− 1
√
1 +
pi
2
√
d− 1. (29)
Proof Since f(t) is decreasing, we have f(0) ≥ f(t) ≥ f(1) for t ∈ [0, 1]. As a
consequence,
E(2, d) ≥ 2
∫ 1
0
f(1) dt = 2f(1) =
d− 1
pi
√
2d− 3 .
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To obtain the upper bound, we proceed as follows.
E(2, d)2 = 4
(∫ 1
0
f(t) dt
)2
≤ 4
∫ 1
0
f(t)2 dt (by Jensen’s inequality)
=
1
pi2
∫ 1
0
1
t
G′(t) dt
(27)
=
1
pi2
∫ 1
0
d−1∑
i=1
4ri
(t2 + ri)2
dt
=
1
pi2
d−1∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
4ri
(t2 + ri)2
dt
=
1
pi2
d−1∑
i=1
(
2
ri + 1
+
cot−1(
√
ri)√
ri
)
. (30)
Note that if ab = 1, then
1
a+ 1
+
1
b+ 1
= 1. (31)
We observe that if z is a zero of Md(t), then
1
z is also a zero because Md(t) =
t2(d−1)Md(1/t). This implies that the sequence {ri, i = 1, . . . , d − 1} can be
grouped into d−12 pairs of the form
(
a, 1a
)
. Using (31), we obtain
1
pi2
d−1∑
i=1
2
ri + 1
=
1
pi2
(d− 1). (32)
For the second term, since cot−1(z) ≤ pi2 for all z ≥ 0, we have
d−1∑
i=1
cot−1(
√
ri)√
ri
≤ pi
2
d−1∑
i=1
1√
ri
=
pi
2
d−1∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
√
rj
d−1∏
i=1
√
ri
=
pi
2
d−1∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
√
rj
≤ pi
2
√√√√(d− 1) d−1∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
rj
=
pi
2
(d− 1) 32 , (33)
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where we have used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality(
n∑
i=1
bi
)2
≤ n
n∑
i=1
b2i ,
and the fact that
d−1∏
i=1
ri = 1 and
d−1∑
i=1
∏
j 6=i
rj = (d − 1)2 according to Vieta’s
theorem for the roots {ri} of Md.
From (30), (32) and (33), we have
E(2, d)2 ≤ 1
pi2
(
(d− 1) + pi
2
(d− 1) 32
)
=
1
pi2
(d− 1)(1 + pi
2
√
d− 1),
or equivalently
E(2, d) ≤ 1
pi
√
d− 1
√
1 +
pi
2
√
d− 1.
In Figure 1a, we show the numerical results for E(2, d) in comparison with the
obtained upper and lower bounds.
Corollary 1 1) The expected number of equilibria increases unboundedly when
d tends to infinity
lim
d→∞
E(2, d) = +∞. (34)
2) The probability pm of observing m equilibria, 1 ≤ m ≤ d− 1, is bounded by
pm ≤ E(2, d)
m
≤ 1
pim
√
d− 1
√
1 +
pi
2
√
d− 1. (35)
In particular,
pd−1 ≤ 1
pi
√
1 + pi2
√
d− 1
√
d− 1 , and limd→∞ pd−1 = 0.
Proof 1) This is a direct consequence of (29), as the lower bound of E(2, d)
tends to infinity when d tends to infinity.
2) This is again a direct consequence of (29) and definition of E(2, d). For any
1 ≤ m ≤ d− 1, we have
E(2, d) =
d−1∑
i=1
pi · i ≥ pm ·m.
In particular,
pd−1 ≤ E(2, d)
d− 1 ≤
1
pi
√
1 + pi2
√
d− 1
√
d− 1 .
As a consequence, lim
d→∞
pd−1 = 0. More generally, we can see that this limit
is true for pk for any k = O(d) as d→∞.
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From this corollary we can see that, interestingly, although the mean num-
ber of equilibria tends to infinity when the number of players d increases,
the probability to see the maximal number of equilibria in a d-player system
converges to 0. There has been extensive research studying the maximal num-
ber of equilibrium points of a dynamical system [MS82,Kar80,VC88a,VC88b,
KF70,VC88c,BCV93,BCV97,Alt10]. Our results suggest that the possibility
to reach such a maximal number is very small when d is sufficiently large.
Corollary 2 The expected number of stable equilibrium points in a random
game with d players and two strategies is equal to E(2,d)2 , and is thus bounded
within to the following interval[
d− 1
2pi
√
2d− 3 ,
1
2pi
√
d− 1
√
1 +
pi
2
√
d− 1
]
.
Proof From [HTG12, Theorem 3], it is known that an equilibrium in a random
game with two strategies and an arbitrary number of players, is stable with
probability 1/2. Hence, the corollary is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
3.2 Two-player multi-strategy games
In this section, we consider games with two players, i.e. d = 2, and arbitrary
strategies. In this case (7) is simplified to a linear system{∑
j β
i
j yj = 0, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1,∑
j yj = 1,
(36)
where βij have Gaussian distributions with mean 0 and variance 1. The main
result of this section is the following explicit formula for E(n, 2).
Theorem 3 We have
E(n, 2) =
1
2n−1
. (37)
This theorem can be seen as a direct application of [HTG12, Theorem 1] and
the definition of E(n, d) in Eq. (14). Indeed, according to [HTG12, Theorem
1], the probability that Eq. (36) has a (unique) isolated solution is p1 = 2
1−n
and the probability of having no solution is 0. By (14), E(n, 2) = p1, and hence
E(n, 2) = 21−n.
To demonstrate further the usefulness of our approach using the ran-
dom polynomial theory, we present here an alternative proof that can di-
rectly obtain E(n, 2), i.e. without computing the probability of observing con-
crete numbers of equilibria. Our proof requires an assumption that {Ai =
(βij)j=1,··· ,n−1; i = 1, . . . , n−1} are independent random vectors. We will elab-
orate and discuss this assumption in Remark 4. The main ingredient of our
proof is the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix 5.4.
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Lemma 3 Let t1, . . . , tn−1 be real numbers, and let L be the matrix with en-
tries
Lii =
1
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
− t
2
i
(1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k)
2
,
Lij =
−titj
(1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k)
2
∀i 6= j.
It holds that
detL =
1(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
)n . (38)
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3 under the assumption that {Ai = (βij)j=1,··· ,n−1; i =
1, . . . , n− 1} are independent random vectors.)
Let L be the matrix in Lemma 3. According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 3,
we have
E(n, 2) = pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫ ∞
0
. . .
∫ ∞
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
(detL)
1/2
dt1 . . . dtn−1
= pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫ ∞
0
. . .
∫ ∞
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1 times
(
1 +
n−1∑
k=1
t2k
)−n/2
dt1 . . . dtn−1
=
1
2
pi−
n−1
2 Γ
(
n− 1
2
)∫ ∞
0
. . .
∫ ∞
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−2 times
(
1 +
n−2∑
k=1
t2k
)−(n−1)/2
dt1 . . . dtn−2
. . .
=
1
2n−1
pi−
1
2Γ
(
1
2
)
=
1
2n−1
,
where we have repeatedly used the equality (with a > 0 and p > 1)∫ ∞
0
(a+ t2)−pdt =
√
pi Γ (p− 12 )
2 Γ (p)
a
1
2−p.
Remark 3 Note that, as in [HTG12, Theorem 2], it is known that the probabil-
ity that a two-player n-strategy random game has a stable (internal) equilib-
rium is at most 2−n. Hence, the expected number of stable equilibrium points
in this case is at most 2−n. From [HTG12, Theorem 2], we also can show that
this bound is sharp only when n = 2.
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Remark 4 LetM be the number of sequences (k1, . . . , kn−1) such that
∑n−1
j=1 kj ≤
d−1. For each i = 1, . . . , n−1, we define a random vector Ai = (βik1,...,kn−1) ∈
RM . Recalling from Section 2 that βik1,...,kn−1 = α
i
k1,...,kn
− αnk1,...,kn , where
αii1,...,id−1 is the payoff of the focal player, with i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) being the strat-
egy of the focal player, and ik (with 1 ≤ ik ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ d − 1) is
the strategy of the player in position k. The assumption in Lemma 1 is that
A1, . . . , An−1 are independent random vectors and each of them has mean 0
and covariance matrix C. This assumption clearly holds for n = 2. For n > 2,
the assumption holds only under quite restrictive conditions such as αnk1,...,kn is
deterministic or αik1,...,kn are essentially identical. Nevertheless, from a purely
mathematical point of view (see for instance [Kos93,Kos02] and Section 4 for
further discussion), it is important to investigate the number of real zeros of
the system (7) under the assumption of independence of {Ai} since this system
has not been studied in the literature. As such, the investigation provides new
insights into the theory of zeros of systems of random polynomials. In addi-
tion, it also gives important hint on the complexity of the game theoretical
question, i.e. the number of expected number of equilibria. Indeed, for d = 2
and arbitrary n, the assumption does not affect the final result as shown in
Theorem 3. We recall that [EK95, Theorem 7.1] also required that the rows
{Ai} are independent random vectors. Hence to treat the general case, one
would need to generalize [EK95, Theorem 7.1] and this is a difficult problem
as demonstrated in [Kos93,Kos02]. With this motivation, in the next section,
we keep the assumption of independence of {Ai} and leave the general case for
future research. We numerically compute the number of zeros of the system
(7) for n ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Again, as we shall see, the numerical results under the
given assumption lead to outcomes closely corroborated by previous works in
[GT10,HTG12].
3.3 Multi-player multi-strategy games
We now move to the general case of multi-player games with multiple strate-
gies. We provide numerical results for this case. For simplicity of notation in
this section we write
∑
k1,...,kn−1
instead of
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,∑n−1
i=1 ki≤d−1
and
∑
k1,...,kn−1|ki1 ,..,kim
instead of
∑
0≤ki≤d−1 ∀i∈S\R,
1≤kj≤d−1 ∀j∈R,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
where S = {1, . . . , n−1} andR = {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ S.
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According to Lemma 1, the expected number of internal equilibria in a
d−player random game with n strategies is given by
E(n, d) = pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫
U
(
det
[
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
]
ij
) 1
2
dt
= pi−
n
2 Γ
(n
2
)∫
U
(detL)
1
2 dt,
where Γ is the Gamma function, and L denotes the matrix with entries
Lij =
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣
y=x=t
.
We have
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2 n∏
i=1
xkii y
ki
i .
Set Π(x, y) :=
n−1∏
l=1
xkll y
kl
l . Then
∂2
∂xiyj
(log v(x)TCv(y))
=
1
xiyj
∑
k1,...,kn−1|ki,kj
kikj
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn−1
)2
Π(x, y)
∑
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn−1
)2
Π(x, y)
−
(
1
xi
∑
k1,...,kn−1|ki
ki
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2
Π(x, y)
)(
1
yj
∑
k1,...,kn|kj
kj
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2
Π(x, y)
)
( ∑
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2
Π(x, y)
)2 .
Therefore
Lij =
1
titj
∑
k1,...,kn−1|ki,kj
kikj
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2∏
l
t2kll
∑
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2∏
l
t2kll
(39)
−
(
1
ti
∑
k1,...,kn−1|ki
ki
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2∏
l
t2kll
)(
1
tj
∑
k1,...,kn−1|kj
kj
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2∏
l
t2kll
)
( ∑
k1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2∏
l
t2kll
)2 .
(40)
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So far in the paper we have assumed that all the βik1,...,kn−1 in Eq. (7) are
standard normal distributions. The following lemma shows, as a consequence
of the above described formula, that all the results obtained so far remain
valid if they have a normal distribution with mean zero and arbitrary variance
(i.e. the entries of the game payoff matrix have the same, arbitrary normal
distribution).
Lemma 4 Suppose βik1,...,kn−1 have normal distributions with mean 0 and ar-
bitrary variance σ2. Then, Lij as defined in (39) does not depend on σ
2.
Proof In this case, βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k
)
has a Gaussian distribution with vari-
ance σ2
(
d− 1
k
)2
and mean 0. Hence,
v(x)TCv(y) =
∑
k1,...,kn−1
σ2
(
d− 1
k1, . . . , kn
)2 n∏
i=1
xkii y
ki
i .
Repeating the same calculation we obtain the same Lij as in (39), which
is independent of σ.
This result suggests that when dealing with random games as in this article,
it is sufficient to consider that payoff entries are from the interval [0, 1] instead
of from an arbitrary one, as done numerically in [GT10]. A similar behaviour
has been observed in [HTG12] for the analysis and computation with small d
or n, showing that results are not dependent on the interval where the payoff
entries are drawn. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this result confirms the
observation that multiplying a payoff matrix by a constant does not change the
equilibria [HS98], provided a one-to-one mapping from [0,1] to the arbitrary
interval.
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Example 2 (d-players with n=3 strategies)
L11 =
1
t21
∑
k1=1,k2=0
k21
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
−
(
1
t1
∑
k1=1,k2=0
k1
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)2
( ∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)2 ,
L12 =
1
t1t2
∑
k1=1,k2=1
k1k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
−
(
1
t1
∑
k1=1,k2=0
k1
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)(
1
t2
∑
k1=0,k2=1
k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)
( ∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)2 ,
L21 = L12,
L22 =
1
t22
∑
k1=0,k2=1
k22
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
−
(
1
t2
∑
k1=0,k2=1
k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)2
( ∑
k1,k2
(
d− 1
k1, k2
)2
t2k11 t
2k2
2
)2 .
Therefore,
E(3, d) = pi−
3
2Γ
(
3
2
)∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
√
L11L22 − L12L21 dt1dt2.
Next we provide some numerical results. We numerically compute E(n, d) for
n ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and show them in Table 1 (for d ≤ 10) and Figure 1b (for
d ≤ 20). We also plot the lower and upper bounds for E(2, d) obtained in
Theorem 2 and compare them with its numerical computation, see Figure 1a.
We note that for small n and d (namely, n ≤ 5 and d ≤ 4), E(n, d) can also be
computed numerically via the probabilities pi of observing exactly i equilibria
using (14). This direct approach has been used in [HTG12] and [GT10], which
our results are compatible with. Furthermore, as a consequence of Corollary 2,
we can derive the exact expected number of stable equilibria for n = 2, which
is equal to half of the expected number of equilibria given in the first row of
Table 1.
4 Discussion
In the evolutionary game literature, mathematical results have been mostly
provided for two-player games [HS98,Now06], despite the abundance of multi-
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Table 1 Expected number of internal equilibria for some values of d and n.
d 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n = 2 0.5 0.77 0.98 1.16 1.31 1.47 1.60 1.73 1.84
n = 3 0.25 0.57 0.92 1.29 1.67 2.06 2.46 2.86 3.27
n = 4 0.125 0.41 0.84 1.39 2.05 2.81 3.67 4.62 5.66
number of players, d
E(2,d)
Lower bound
Upper bound
a b
ex
pe
cte
d 
nu
m
be
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ilib
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(n
,d
)
n = 2
n = 3
n = 4
Fig. 1 (a) Expected number of equilibria, E(2, d), for varying the number of
players in the game, and the upper and lower bounds obtained in Theorem 2.
(b) Expected number of equilibria, E(n, d), for varying the number of players
and strategies in the game. We plot for different number of strategies: n = 2, 3 and
4. The payoff entries of the d-player n-strategy game are randomly drawn from the normal
distribution. In general, the larger the number of players in the game, the higher the number
of equilibria one can expect if the payoff entries of the game are randomly chosen. We observe
that for small d, E(n, d) increases with n while it decreases for large d (namely, d ≥ 5, see
also Table 1). The results were obtained numerically using Mathematica.
player game examples in nature [BCV97,GT10]. The mathematical study
for multi-player games has only attracted more attention recently, appar-
ently because the resulting complexity and dynamics from the games are
significantly magnified with the number of the game participants [BCV97,
HTG12,WTG13]. As seen from our analysis, multi-player games introduce
non-linearity into the inducing equations, because the fitness functions are
polynomial instead of linear as in the pairwise interactions [HS98,GT10,WTG13].
It is even more so if we consider scenarios in which the payoff matrix is
non-linear naturally, such as for public goods games with non-linear returns
[PSSS09], as observed in animals hunting [Sta92,PC97]. In addition, as the
number of strategies increases, one needs to deal with systems of multivari-
ate polynomials. This seemingly complexity of the general multi-player multi-
strategy games makes the analysis of the equilibrium points extremely difficult.
For instance, in [HTG12], as the analysis was based on an explicit calculation
of the zeros of systems of polynomials, it cannot go beyond games with a small
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number of players (namely, d ≤ 5), even for the simplest case of n = 2. Here
we have taken a different approach based on the well-established theory of ran-
dom polynomials. We have derived a computationally implementable formula,
E(n, d), of the mean number of equilibria in a general random d-player game
with n strategies. For n = 2 and with an arbitrary d, we have derived asymp-
totic upper and lower bounds of E(2, d). An interesting implication of these re-
sults is that although the expected number of equilibria tends to infinity when
d increases, the probability of seeing the maximal possible number of equilibria
tends to 0. This is a notable observation since knowing the maximal number
of equilibrium points in an evolutionary process is insightful and has been of
special focus in biological contexts [Lev00,GT10]. Furthermore, for d = 2 with
an arbitrary n, we have derived the exact value E(n, 2) = 21−n, recovering
results obtained in [HTG12]. In the general case, based on the formula that
we have derived, we have been able to numerically calculate E(n, d), thereby
going beyond the analytical and numerical computations from previous work
that made use of the direct approach. As a consequence of the results obtained
for the extreme cases, we could also derive the boundaries for the expected
number of equilibrium points when counting only the stable ones. Note that
some studies have been carried out to study the stable equilibrium points or
evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) [MS82] in a random evolutionary game,
but it has been mostly done for two-player games, see for example [Hai88,
KS09,HRW08]. As such, we have provided further understanding with respect
to the asymptotic behaviour of the expected number of stable equilibria for
multi-player random games, though with only two strategies, leaving the more
general case for future study.
On the other hand, in the random polynomial literature, the study of
distribution of zeros of system of random polynomials as described in (8),
especially in the univariate case, has been carried out by many authors, see
for instance [EK95] for a nice exposition and [TV14] for the most recent re-
sults. The most well-known classes of polynomials are: flat polynomials or
Weyl polynomials for ai :=
1
i! , elliptic polynomials or binomial polynomials
for ai :=
√(
d− 1
i
)
and Kac polynomials for ai := 1. We emphasize the dif-
ference between the polynomial studied in this paper with the elliptic case:
ai =
(
d− 1
i
)
are binomial coefficients, not their square root. In the ellip-
tic case, v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)
xiyi = (1 + xy)d−1, and as a result
E = E(2, d) =
√
d− 1. While in our case, because of the square in the coeffi-
cients, v(x)TCv(y) =
∑d−1
i=1
(
d− 1
i
)2
xiyi is no longer a generating function.
Whether one can find an exact formula for E(2, d) is unclear. For the multi-
variate situation, the exact formula for E(n, 2) is interesting by itself and we
could not be able to find it in the literature. Due to the complexity in the
general case d, n ≥ 3, further research is required.
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In short, we have described a novel approach to calculating and analyz-
ing the expected number of (stable) equilibrium points in a general random
evolutionary game, giving insights into the overall complexity of such dynam-
ical systems as the players and the strategies in the game increase. Since the
theory of random polynomials is rich, we envisage that our method could be
extended to obtain results for other more complex scenarios such as games
having a payoff matrix with dependent entries and/or with general distribu-
tions.
5 Appendix
5.1 Properties of ak
In the following we prove that a2d−4−k = ak for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 2d − 4, i.e. (22).
First, we transform ak as follows
ak =
∑
0≤i≤d−1
0≤j≤d−2
i+j=k
(
d− 1
i
)2(
d− 2
j
)2
−
∑
0≤i′≤d−2
0≤j′≤d−2
i′+j′=k−1
(
d− 2
i′
)(
d− 1
i′ + 1
)(
d− 2
j′
)(
d− 1
j′ + 1
)
=
(
d− 2
k
)2
+
∑
0≤i≤d−2
0≤j≤d−2
i+j=k−1
(
d− 1
i+ 1
)2(
d− 2
j
)2
−
∑
0≤i′≤d−2
0≤j′≤d−2
i′+j′=k−1
(
d− 2
i′
)(
d− 1
i′ + 1
)(
d− 2
j′
)(
d− 1
j′ + 1
)
=
(
d− 2
k
)2
+
∑
0≤i≤d−2
0≤j≤d−2
i+j=k−1
(
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))
=
(
d− 2
k
)2
+
∑
0≤i≤j≤d−2
i+j=k−1
((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
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Now we prove that a2d−4−k = ak. Indeed, we have
a2d−4−k =
(
d− 2
2d− 4− k
)2
+
∑
0≤i≤j≤d−2
i+j=2d−k−5
((
d− 2
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
(we use here the transformations i = d− 3− i and j = d− 3− j)
=
(
d− 2
2d− 4− k
)2
+
∑
−1≤j≤i≤d−3
i+j=k−1
((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j + 1
)
−
(
d− 2
i+ 1
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
=
(
d− 2
2d− 4− k
)2
+
∑
−1≤j≤i≤d−3
i+j=k−1
((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
.
Since for j = −1 and i = k we have((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
=
(
d− 1
k
)2
,
and for j = d− 2 and i = k − 1− (d− 2), we have((
d− 1
i+ 1
)(
d− 2
j
)
−
(
d− 2
i
)(
d− 1
j + 1
))2
=
((
d− 1
k − (d− 2)
)
−
(
d− 2
k − 1− (d− 2)
))2
=
(
d− 2
k − (d− 2)
)2
=
(
d− 2
2d− 4− k
)2
,
it follows that a2d−4−k = ak for all 0 ≤ k ≤ 2d− 4.
5.2 Detailed computation of f(1)
We use the following identities involving the square of binomial coefficients.
Md(1) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
=
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
,
Ad(1) = (d− 1)2Md−1(1) = (d− 1)2
(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
,
Bd(1) =
d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
=
d− 1
2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
.
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Therefore, we have
f(1) =
1
pi
√
Ad(1)Md(1)−Bd(1)2
Md(1)
=
1
pi
√
(d− 1)2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)[(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 14
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)]
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
=
d− 1
pi
×
√√√√√√√
(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
) − 1
4
=
d− 1
pi
×
√
d− 1
2(2d− 3) −
1
4
=
d− 1
2pi
√
2d− 3 ,
where we have used the identity
(
2(n+ 1)
n+ 1
)
= n+12(2n+1)
(
2n
n
)
.
5.3 Alternative proof of the fifth property in Lemma 2
We show here an alternative proof of the fifth property without using the first
one in Lemma 2.
Since Md
(
1
t
)
= t2(1−d)Md(t), we have
M ′d
(
1
t
)
= −t3−2d [2(1− d)Md(t) + tM ′d(t)] ,
M ′′d
(
1
t
)
= t4−2d
[
2(3− 2d)(1− d)Md(t) + 2(3− 2d)tM ′d(t) + t2M ′′d (t)
]
.
Therefore, from (26), we have
Bd
(
1
t
)
=
1
2
M ′d
(
1
t
)
= −t3−2d
[
(1− d)Md(t) + 1
2
tM ′d(t)
]
,
and
Ad
(
1
t
)
=
t
4
[
M ′d
(
1
t
)
+
1
t
M ′′d
(
1
t
)]
=
1
4
t4−2d
[
4(1− d)2 + (5− 4d)tM ′d(t) + t2M ′′d (t)
]
.
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Hence
Ad
(
1
t
)
Md
(
1
t
)
−Bd
(
1
t
)2
=
1
4
t6−2d
[
4(1− d)2Md(t)2 + (5− 4d)tM ′d(t)Md(t) + t2M ′′d (t)Md(t)
]
− t6−4d
[
(1− d)Md(t) + 1
2
tM ′d(t)
]2
=
1
4
t6−2d
[
tMd(t)M
′
d(t) + t
2Md(t)M
′′
d (t)− t2M ′d(t)2
]
=
1
4
t8−2d
[
1
t
Md(t)M
′
d(t) +Md(t)M
′′
d (t)−M ′d(t)2
]
.
Therefore,
f
(
1
t
)
=
1
pi
√
Ad
(
1
t
)
Md
(
1
t
)−Bd ( 1t )2
Md
(
1
t
)
=
1
pi
t4−2d
√
1
4t [Md(t)M
′
d(t) + tMd(t)M
′′
d (t)− tM ′d(t)2]
t2−2dMd(t)
= t2
1
pi
√
1
4t [Md(t)M
′
d(t) + tMd(t)M
′′
d (t)− tM ′d(t)2]
Md(t)
= t2f(t).
5.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Denoting Σ = 1 +
∑n−1
k=1 t
2
k, we have
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detL =
1
Σ2(n−1)
det

Σ − t21 −t1t2 . . . −t1tn−1
−t2t1 Σ − t22 . . . −t2tn−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−tn−1t1 −tn−1t2 . . . Σ − t2n−1

=
1
t1 . . . tn−1
1
Σ2(n−1)
det

t1(Σ − t21) −t1t22 . . . −t1t2n−1
−t2t21 t2(Σ − t22) . . . −t2t2n−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
−tn−1t21 −tn−1t22 . . . tn−1(Σ − t2n−1)

=
1
t1 . . . tn−1
1
Σ2(n−1)
det

t1 −t1t22 . . . −t1t2n−1
t2 t2(Σ − t22) . . . −t2t2n−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
tn−1 −tn−1t22 . . . tn−1(Σ − t2n−1)

=
1
Σ2(n−1)
det

1 −t22 . . . −t2n−1
1 Σ − t22 . . . −t2n−1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1 −t22 . . . Σ − t2n−1

=
1
Σ2(n−1)
det

1 −t22 . . . −t2n−1
0 Σ . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . Σ

=
1
Σn
.
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